Threat landscape

Each year, ASD’s ACSC maps the incidents it handles to MITRE ATT&CK. I redrew the top 10 techniques from its 2025–26 report, then added what I make of them.

Top 10 MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed, FY2025–26
  1. PhishingInitial Access · T156639%
  2. Compromise AccountsResource Development · T158621%
  3. User ExecutionExecution · T120417%
  4. Valid AccountsInitial Access · T107815%
  5. Social EngineeringStealth · T168413%
  6. Gather Victim Identity InformationReconnaissance · T158913%
  7. Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access · T119013%
  8. Network Denial of ServiceImpact · T149811%
  9. Phishing for InformationReconnaissance · T159811%
  10. Acquire InfrastructureResource Development · T158310%

Data: ASD’s ACSC, Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025–26 (Figure 8). Technique names, IDs and tactics: MITRE ATT&CK®. Percentages overlap (they total more than 100%) because one incident can involve several techniques. Chart redrawn by David Tran.

My take

Attackers are skipping the homework

One thing that stood out to me was the shift in attacker behaviour. Gathering victim identity information fell from 30% to 13%, suggesting attackers are spending less time researching their targets and focusing more on gaining access. Phishing was the most reported technique at 39%, followed by compromised accounts at 21%.

These techniques are different. Phishing (T1566) involves tricking people into revealing information or taking an action that gives attackers access. Compromised Accounts (T1586) involves taking over legitimate accounts that can support further attacks. Valid Accounts (T1078), at 15%, is particularly relevant because it describes attackers using legitimate credentials to access systems.

What concerns me is how difficult this activity can be to recognise. An attacker using a legitimate account may appear to be a genuine employee or trusted contact.

What surprised me

Critical infrastructure. Financial and insurance services accounted for 30% of reported incidents in this group, followed by public administration and safety at 21%, and electricity, gas, water and waste services at 17% (approximately 46, 32 and 26 incidents).

These are services we rely on every day. However, these incidents represented around 10% of the total and were slightly lower than the previous year. This is a reminder to consider the context rather than assume attacks are increasing.

Attacks by core CI sectors
  1. Financial and insurance services~46 incidents30%
  2. Public administration and safety~32 incidents21%
  3. Electricity, gas, water and waste~26 incidents17%
  4. Other CI sectors (combined)~49 incidents32%

Distribution of 154 critical infrastructure incidents by sector, FY2025–26. Other CI sectors combines all remaining sectors. Source: ASD's ACSC Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025–26, Critical Infrastructure.

What we can do

Four simple habits can help reduce our exposure to cyber threats:

  1. Review privacy settings. Be careful about what personal information you share online.
  2. Enable multi-factor authentication. Add another layer of protection to your accounts.
  3. Use unique passwords. Avoid reusing passwords across different services.
  4. Think before sharing personal information. Details such as birthdays and pet names can help attackers make educated guesses.

My key takeaway

Cybersecurity isn't just about stopping someone from getting through the front door. It's also about recognising when an attacker is already inside. Organisations need strong identity controls, MFA, access monitoring and effective detection capabilities to identify suspicious activity before it causes significant damage.

Limits of this data

The ACSC figures cover incidents it handled, not every attack in Australia. Technique percentages overlap because one incident can involve several techniques. The password statistics come from a separate survey and reflect self-reported behaviour.

Sources: ASD's ACSC Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025–26; MITRE ATT&CK; SOCRadar. Commentary by David Tran.